



缔约方会议

2018年12月2日至15日在卡托维兹举行的缔约方会议  
第二十四届会议报告

增编

第二部分：缔约方会议第二十四届会议采取的行动

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## 第 1/CP.24 号决定

### 筹备《巴黎协定》的实施和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第一届会议

缔约方会议，

忆及在《公约》下通过的《巴黎协定》，

又忆及第 1/CP.21 号、第 1/CP.22 号、第 1/CP.23 号、第 1/CMA.1 号和第 3/CMA.1 号决定，

还忆及第 6/CP.1 号、第 6/CP.2 号、第 25/CP.7 号、第 5/CP.13 号、第 12/CP.20 号和第 10/CP.21 号决定，

特别忆及第 1/CP.21 号决定第 91 段，其中请《巴黎协定》特设工作组根据《巴黎协定》第十三条第十三款，拟定模式、程序和指南的建议，并确定首次及此后审评及酌情定期更新这些模式、程序和指南的年份，供《公约》缔约方会议第二十四届会议审议，以期转交作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第一届会议审议和通过，

又特别忆及第 1/CP.21 号决定第 98 段，其中决定《巴黎协定》下关于强化透明度框架的模式、程序和指南应立足于并最终在最后的两年期报告和两年期更新报告提交之后立即取代第 1/CP.16 号决定第 40 至 47 段和第 60 至 64 段及第 2/CP.17 号决定第 12 至 62 段设立的衡量、报告和核实制度，

#### 一. 《巴黎协定》工作方案

1. 祝贺已批准、接受、核可或加入《巴黎协定》的缔约方；
2. 表示感谢各附属机构和组成机构依照第 1/CP.21 号、第 1/CP.22 号和第 1/CP.23 号决定努力落实《巴黎协定》下的工作方案；
3. 重申作为全球应对气候变化的国家自主贡献，所有缔约方将采取并通报《巴黎协定》第四条、第七条、第九条、第十条、第十一条和第十三条所界定的有力度的努力，以实现该协定第二条所述的目的；
4. 决定将以下各项决定草案转交作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第一届会议第三期会议审议和通过：<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 除了所列的各项决定草案之外，附属履行机构第四十九届会议和第四十八届会议分别转交了题为“《巴黎协定》第四条第十款所述国家自主贡献的共同时间框架”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现第 6/CMA.1 号决定)和题为“促进开展教育、培训、公众意识、公众参与和公众获取信息的方式，以便加强《巴黎协定》之下的行动”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现第 17/CMA.1 号决定)，供作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第一届会议第三期会议审议和通过。

与《巴黎协定》第四条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 22 至 35 段有关的事项

(a) 题为“与第 1/CP.21 号决定减缓一节有关的进一步指导意见”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 4/CMA.1 号决定);

(b) 题为“《巴黎协定》第四条第十二款所述公共登记册运作和使用的模式和程序”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 5/CMA.1 号决定);

(c) 题为“实施应对措施的影响问题论坛在《巴黎协定》之下的模式、工作方案和职能”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 7/CMA.1 号决定);

与《巴黎协定》第六条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 36 至 40 段有关的事项

(d) 题为“与《巴黎协定》第六条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 36 至 40 段有关的事项”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 8/CMA.1 号决定);

与《巴黎协定》第七条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 41、42 和 45 段有关的事项

(e) 题为“关于适应信息通报的进一步指导意见，包括除其他外作为《巴黎协定》第七条第十和第十一款所指国家自主贡献信息通报的一部分”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 9/CMA.1 号决定);

(f) 题为“《巴黎协定》第七条第十二款所述公共登记册运作和使用的模式和程序”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 10/CMA.1 号决定);

(g) 题为“第 1/CP.21 号决定第 41、42 和 45 段提到的事项”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 11/CMA.1 号决定);

与《巴黎协定》第九条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 52 至 64 段有关的事项

(h) 题为“明确缔约方将根据《巴黎协定》第九条第五款提供的信息”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 12/CMA.1 号决定);

(i) “根据《巴黎协定》第九条第七款核算通过公共干预措施提供和调集的资金模式”;<sup>2</sup>

(j) 题为“与适应基金有关的事项”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 13/CMA.1 号决定);

与《巴黎协定》第十条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 66 至 70 段有关的事项

(k) 题为“根据《巴黎协定》第十条第四款建立的技术框架”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 15/CMA.1 号决定);

(l) 题为“第 1/CP.21 号决定第 69 段所述定期评估的范围和模式”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 16/CMA.1 号决定);

<sup>2</sup> 关于这一事项的成果已纳入题为“《巴黎协定》第十三条所述行动和支助透明度框架的模式、程序和指南”的决定草案-/CMA.1(作为第 18/CMA.1 号决定获得通过)附件第五章。

与《巴黎协定》第十三条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 84 至 98 段有关的事项

(m) 题为“《巴黎协定》第十三条所述行动和支助透明度框架的模式、程序和指南”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 18/CMA.1 号决定);<sup>3</sup>

与《巴黎协定》第十四条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 99 至 101 段有关的事项

(n) 题为“与《巴黎协定》第十四条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 99 至 101 段有关的事项”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 19/CMA.1 号决定);

与《巴黎协定》第十五条和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 102 和 103 段有关的事项

(o) 题为“《巴黎协定》第十五条第二款所述促进履行和遵守的委员会有效运作的模式和程序”的决定草案-/CMA.1(现为第 20/CMA.1 号决定);

5. 又决定《巴黎协定》特设工作组按照第 1/CP.21 号决定开展的工作已经完成;

## 二. 气候资金问题高级别部长级对话

6. 欢迎根据第 3/CP.19 号决定第 13 段举行的第三次气候资金问题高级别部长级对话;

7. 注意到对话突出说明了将气候资金需求转化为行动并加强发展中国家获得气候资金的进展以及这方面仍然存在的障碍;

8. 赞赏地欢迎缔约方的认捐和声明,包括对绿色气候基金、最不发达国家基金和适应基金的认捐,以及国际金融机构的认捐和声明,这些认捐和声明使 2020 年之前的气候资金流量更加明朗并可以预测;

9. 又赞赏地欢迎资金问题常设委员会 2018 年气候资金流量两年期评估和概览,特别是其主要结论和建议,其中着重指出,从发达国家缔约方流向发展中国家缔约方的气候资金流量有所增加;<sup>4</sup>

10. 注意到对话强调迫切需要扩大筹集气候资金的范围,包括通过更多地吸引私营部门参与,增加适应资金,并使资金流动与《巴黎协定》的目标和联合国可持续发展目标保持一致;

11. 又注意到对话重点提到了最近启动的绿色气候基金充资进程,认为这是一个加强力度的明确机会,并强调气候资金必须透明并可以预测,必须制定明确的获得资助的资格标准以及强有力的国家政策和监管框架,以加强气候资金的筹集和获取;

12. 还注意到缔约方会议第二十四届会议主席将根据第 3/CP.19 号决定第 13 段总结对话的讨论情况,供缔约方会议第二十五届会议(2019 年 12 月)审议;

<sup>3</sup> 见上文脚注 2。

<sup>4</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8, 附件二。

### 三. 实施和力度

13. 关切地注意到当前因特别容易受到气候变化不利影响的发展中国家发生的极端天气事件和缓发事件而产生的紧迫的新型需求；

14. 强调迫切需要加大力度，以确保所有缔约方尽可能做出最大限度的减缓和适应努力；

15. 认识到迫切需要发达国家缔约方以可预测的方式进一步提供资金、技术和能力建设支持，以便发展中国家缔约方加强行动；

#### 2020 年之前

16. 强调加大 2020 年前的力度可为加大 2020 年后的力度奠定坚实基础；

17. 祝贺已接受《京都议定书多哈修正案》的缔约方；

18. 着重指出《多哈修正案》亟需生效，并敦促尚未批准《京都议定书多哈修正案》的《京都议定书》缔约方尽快向保存人交存接受书；

19. 欢迎 2018 年举行的 2020 年前实施和力度盘点会议；重申决定<sup>5</sup> 在第二十五届会议上再召开一次盘点会议；

20. 促请发达国家缔约方继续加大力度筹集气候资金，同时忆及在实质性缓解行动和执行透明度框架内，发达国家缔约方承诺依照第 1/CP.16 号决定，争取在 2020 年之前每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元，满足发展中国家的需要；

#### 2020 年之后

21. 再次请<sup>6</sup> 各缔约方按照《巴黎协定》第四条第十九款，在 2020 年之前通报本世纪中叶长期温室气体低排放发展战略，并欢迎已经通报的战略；

22. 又再次请<sup>7</sup> 那些根据第 1/CP.20 号决定提交的预期国家自主贡献内所含时间框架直至 2025 年的缔约方，最晚在 2020 年通报一次新的国家自主贡献，并根据《巴黎协定》第四条第九款，此后每五年通报一次；

23. 还再次请<sup>8</sup> 那些根据第 1/CP.20 号决定提交的预期国家自主贡献内所含时间框架直至 2030 年的缔约方，最晚在 2020 年通报或更新它们的国家自主贡献，并根据《巴黎协定》第四条第九款，此后每五年通报一次；

### 四. 政府间气候变化专门委员会的特别报告

24. 确认政府间气候变化专门委员会在可持续发展和消除贫困的背景下加强全球应对气候变化威胁的过程中向缔约国提供科学信息方面发挥的作用；

<sup>5</sup> 第 1/CP.23 号决定第 18 段。

<sup>6</sup> 第 1/CP.21 号决定第 35 段。

<sup>7</sup> 第 1/CP.21 号决定第 23 段。

<sup>8</sup> 第 1/CP.21 号决定第 24 段。

25. 表示赞赏和感谢政府间气候变化专门委员会和科学界响应缔约方会议的邀请，提供关于全球升温 1.5°C 的特别报告，<sup>9</sup> 报告反映了现有的最佳科学；

26. 欢迎政府间气候变化专门委员会应第 1/CP.21 号决定第 21 段中缔约方的邀请，及时完成关于全球升温 1.5°C 的特别报告；

27. 邀请缔约方在附属机构和理事机构所有相关议程项目下的讨论中运用上文第 25 段所述报告中的信息；

28. 请附属科学技术咨询机构在其第五十届会议(2019 年 6 月)上审议上文第 25 段所述报告，以期加强关于 1.5°C 目标的科学知识，包括将其贯彻到政府间气候变化专门委员会第六次评估报告的编写工作以及《公约》和《巴黎协定》的实施工作；

29. 鼓励各缔约方继续支持政府间气候变化专门委员会的工作；

## 五. 塔拉诺阿对话

30. 忆及缔约方会议决定<sup>10</sup> 在 2018 年召开缔约方之间的促进性对话，以盘点缔约方在争取实现《巴黎协定》第四条第一款所述长期目标方面付出的集体努力，并为按照《巴黎协定》第四条第八款拟定国家自主贡献提供信息；

31. 表示感谢缔约方会议第二十三届会议主席和第二十四届会议主席在组织、开展和完成“塔拉诺阿对话”方面发挥的领导作用；

32. 又表示感谢斐济和太平洋地区的人民将“塔拉诺阿”传统引入《气候公约》进程，这项传统的宗旨是分享经历、建立共鸣、产生信任；

33. 承认“塔拉诺阿对话”是一个包容各方的参与性进程，激励缔约方和非缔约方利害关系方遵循太平洋地区的“塔拉诺阿”传统进行交流；

34. 又承认“塔拉诺阿对话”盘点了缔约方在争取实现《巴黎协定》第四条第一款所述长期目标方面付出的集体努力，并按照《巴黎协定》第四条第八款为拟定国家自主贡献提供了信息；

35. 注意到“塔拉诺阿对话”的成果、汇集的信息和得出的产物，<sup>11</sup> 以及上述成果、信息和产物增强信心、增添勇气和加大力度的潜力；

36. 肯定缔约方和非缔约方利害关系方正在为加强气候行动付出的努力和开展的行动；

37. 邀请缔约方在拟定国家自主贡献和努力加强 2020 年前的实施和力度过程中，将“塔拉诺阿对话”的成果、汇集的信息和得出的产物纳入考量；

<sup>9</sup> 政府间气候变化专门委员会，2018 年。《全球升温 1.5°C：气专委关于全球升温超过工业化前水平 1.5°C 的影响及相关全球温室气体排放路径，同时联系加强对气候变化威胁的全球应对、可持续发展和消除贫困的努力问题的特别报告》。见 <http://ipcc.ch/report/sr15/>。

<sup>10</sup> 第 1/CP.21 号决定第 20 段。

<sup>11</sup> 有关成果、汇集的信息和得出的产物见 <https://talanoadialogue.com/>。

## 六. 与《巴黎协定》第十三条所述行动和支助透明度框架的模式、程序和指南有关的事项

38. 决定根据第 1/CP.21 号决定第 98 段，对同时也是《巴黎协定》缔约方的《公约》缔约方而言，最后的两年期报告为不迟于 2022 年 12 月 31 日提交秘书处的报告，最后的两年期更新报告为不迟于 2024 年 12 月 31 日提交秘书处的报告；

39. 重申根据第 1/CP.21 号决定第 98 段，对《巴黎协定》缔约方而言，在提交最后的两年期报告和两年期更新报告后，第 18/CMA.1 号决定附件所载的模式、程序和指南将取代第 1/CP.16 号决定第 40 至 47 段和第 60 至 64 段及第 2/CP.17 号决定第 12 至 62 段设立的衡量、报告和核实制度；

40. 又重申《公约》第四条和第十二条规定的报告义务；

41. 在这方面决定，对于《巴黎协定》缔约方而言，按照上文第 39 段所述的模式、程序和指南编写的两年期透明度报告以及开展的技术专家审查和关于进展情况的促进性多边审议将取代第 2/CP.17 号决定中提到的两年期报告、两年期更新报告、国际评估和审查以及国际协商和分析；

42. 又决定，为履行《公约》规定的国家清单报告义务，根据《公约》提交年度国家清单报告的《巴黎协定》缔约方在《巴黎协定》规定的初次提交报告截止日期之前，应使用第 18/CMA.1 号决定附件第二章所载的提交国家清单报告的模式、程序和指南，技术专家审查将根据第 18/CMA.1 号决定附件第七章所载的相应模式、程序和指南进行，而不是第 24/CP.19 号决定附件所载的温室气体清单报告指南和第 13/CP.20 号决定附件中的审查指南，包括在根据《巴黎协定》不需提交两年期透明度报告的年份；

43. 还决定，关于每四年报告和审查《公约》下的国家信息通报问题，自《巴黎协定》规定的初次提交报告截止日期起：

(a) 对于第 4/CP.5 和第 17/CP.8 号决定(酌情)所载国家信息通报报告指南所涵盖的信息，缔约方可根据第 18/CMA.1 号决定附件所载的模式、程序和指南，将其国家信息通报和两年期透明度报告作为单一报告提交；

(b) 此外，缔约方应在报告中列入：

(一) 根据第 4/CP.5 和第 17/CP.8 号决定(酌情)所载相关指南提交的关于研究和系统观察以及教育、培训和公众意识的补充章节；

(二) 对于尚未根据第 18/CMA.1 号决定附件第四章提交报告的缔约方，根据第 4/CP.5 和第 17/CP.8 号决定(酌情)所载相关指南提交的关于适应的新增章节；

(c) 对于根据第 13/CP.20 号决定接受国家信息通报审查的缔约方，审查应按照第 18/CMA.1 号决定附件第七章所载相关指南进行，还应根据第 13/CP.20 号决定(酌情)的相关指导意见，对根据上文第 43(b)段提交的信息进行审查；

44. 重申对于不是《巴黎协定》缔约方的《公约》缔约方而言，《公约》第四条和第十二条规定的报告义务以及《公约》下现有的衡量、报告和核实安排按照有关决定应继续适用；并决定，为了提高信息的可比性，这些缔约方可以使

用第 18/CMA.1 号决定附件所载的模式、程序和指南，以及上文第 43(b)段所述关于国家信息通报的信息，而不是在《公约》下通过的指导意见，履行《公约》第四条和第十二条规定的报告义务；

45. 决定第 14/CP.19 号决定(其中载有第 1/CP.16 号决定第 70 段所述活动的衡量、报告和核实模式)第 7 段所述技术附件应作为两年期透明度报告的附件提交；

46. 又决定第 14/CP.19 号决定(其中载有第 1/CP.16 号决定第 70 段所述活动的衡量、报告和核实模式)第 11 段所述技术分析应与根据《巴黎协定》第十三条进行的技术专家审查同时进行；

## 七. 领导人峰会

47. 欢迎各国元首和政府首脑出席 2018 年 12 月 3 日在波兰卡托维兹举行的领导人峰会；

48. 注意到《西里西亚团结与公正过渡宣言》，<sup>12</sup> 其中承认须将劳动力公正过渡和创造体面工作和优质岗位的要求纳入考量；

## 八. 2019 年联合国气候峰会

49. 欢迎联合国秘书长关于召开 2019 年气候峰会的倡议；

50. 呼吁各缔约方参加峰会，并通过这种参与表明其加大了应对气候变化的力度；

## 九. 行政和预算事项

51. 注意到本决定所述将由秘书处开展的活动所涉估计预算问题；

52. 请秘书处在具备资金的情况下采取本决定所要求的行动。

第 9 次全体会议  
2018 年 12 月 15 日

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<sup>12</sup> <https://cop24.gov.pl/presidency/initiatives/just-transition-declaration/>。



## 第 2/CP.24 号决定

### 地方社区和土著人民平台

缔约方会议，

忆及《联合国宪章》和联合国大会第 66/288 号决议，

还忆及《巴黎协定》、第 1/CP.21 号决定和第 2/CP.23 号决定，

强调将按照国际法履行地方社区和土著人民平台及其促进工作组的宗旨和职能，

还强调在履行地方社区和土著人民平台涉及土著人民的职能方面，《联合国土著人民权利宣言》的整体性，

又强调在履行地方社区和土著人民平台涉及地方社区的职能方面，任何活动均不得授权或鼓励采取任何行动，完全或部分地分裂或损害主权和独立国家的领土完整或政治团结，

1. 决定建立地方社区和土著人民平台促进工作组；
2. 申明设立促进工作组的目的是推动地方社区和土著人民平台进一步投入运作并促进其职能的履行；
3. 决定促进工作组由以下 14 名代表组成：
  - (a) 联合国五个区域集团中各一名缔约方代表；
  - (b) 小岛屿发展中国家一名缔约方代表；
  - (c) 最不发达国家一名缔约方代表；
  - (d) 七名土著人民组织代表，其中联合国七个土著社会文化区域各一名；
4. 请附属科学技术咨询机构在下文第 27 段所述的审查过程中，顾及与地方社区代表性有关的进展情况，考虑额外增加至少三名地方社区代表并审议委派此类代表的程序；并考虑额外增加同等人数的缔约方代表，以便就地方社区在地方社区和土著人民平台中的代表性提出一项决定草案，供缔约方会议第二十七届会议(2021 年 11 月)审议和通过；
5. 决定缔约方代表应由其各自的区域集团和类组委派，并将委派情况通知附属科学技术咨询机构主席；
6. 还决定土著人民代表应由土著人民通过其联络点委派，并将委派情况通知附属科学技术咨询机构主席；
7. 又决定根据上文第 3-6 段所述的委派程序，可为每名代表指定一候补代表，如代表不能与会，候补代表将代为出席会议，如代表无法完成规定任期的职责，候补代表将在剩余任期代行该代表职责；
8. 决定促进工作组的代表任期三年，不得连任两届，代表在其继任者选出之前仍将留任；

9. 还决定促进工作组每年从其代表中选出两名共同主席和两名共同副主席，各任期一年，其中一名共同主席和一名共同副主席为缔约方代表，另一名共同主席和共同副主席为土著人民代表，如适当，亦可为地方社区代表；

10. 又决定共同主席和共同副主席的选举和轮替将考虑到地域平衡，并努力实现性别平衡；

11. 决定如果一共同主席暂时不能履行职责，则由其各自方的共同副主席担任共同主席；

12. 还决定如果一共同主席或共同副主席无法完成任期，则促进工作组应根据上文第 9 和第 10 段遴选一名替补者来完成任期；

13. 邀请缔约方推动地方社区接触地方社区和土著人民平台，以加强它们对促进工作组和该平台的参与；

14. 强调必须根据第 36/CP.7、第 23/CP.18 和第 3/CP.23 号决定在代表的委派过程中努力实现性别平衡；

15. 决定促进工作组应在协商一致基础上运作；

16. 邀请各缔约方、地方社区和土著人民在地方、国家和区域各级考虑到地方社区和土著人民平台及其职能，以便加强土著人民和地方社区的参与和融入，促进以全面和综合方式交流分享有关减缓和适应的经验教训和最佳做法；

17. 决定促进工作组每年与附属机构的届会和缔约方会议的届会同期举行两次会议；

18. 还决定促进工作组将采用渐进方针，提出 2020-2021 年期间履行地方社区和土著人民平台职能的初次两年期工作计划，供附属科学技术咨询机构第五十一届会议(2019 年 12 月)审议；

19. 又决定上文第 18 段提到的工作计划应考虑到已在地方社区和土著人民平台下开展的各项活动的经验，工作计划则可包括与缔约方会议和附属科学技术咨询机构届会同期举办的年度会期活动，促进性工作组将就这些活动编写可能具有技术性的纪要报告；

20. 鼓励促进工作组酌情与《公约》之下和之外的其他机构合作，加强地方社区和土著人民平台在《公约》之下开展的行动的一致性；

21. 请秘书处在促进工作组的支持下，广泛宣传地方社区和土著人民平台的工作，包括为此在《气候公约》网站上建立一个地方社区和土著人民平台专用门户网站；

22. 还请秘书处与附属科学技术咨询机构第五十届会议(2019 年 6 月)同期组织一次会期专题讲习班，探讨加强除土著人民外的地方社区在地方社区和土著人民平台中的参与问题；

23. 又请秘书处在附属科学和技术咨询机构每届会议上，根据推动地方社区和土著人民平台投入运作的渐进方针，制订与履行该平台所有三项职能相关的

活动，<sup>1</sup> 直到工作计划获得通过，并邀请缔约方、观察员和其他利害关系方在 2019 年 2 月 28 日之前通过提交材料门户网站，<sup>2</sup> 就可能开展的活动提交意见；

24. 请促进工作组通过附属科学技术咨询机构第五十四届会议(2021 年 5 月至 6 月)报告其成果，包括第二个三年期工作计划草案以及地方社区和土著人民平台的活动情况，供缔约方会议第二十七届会议审议；

25. 决定在其第二十七届会议上核准上文第 24 段所述工作计划草案；

26. 请秘书处在《气候公约》网站上公布上文第 24 段所述报告；

27. 决定附属科学技术咨询机构在第五十四届会议上审查促进工作组的成果和活动，同时考虑到上文第 24 段所述报告，并向缔约方会议第二十七届会议提出建议，以期缔约方会议就审查结果通过一项决定；

28. 还决定促进工作组的首个任务期限为三年，根据上文第 27 段所述审查情况确定是否延期；

29. 又决定促进工作组的会议应开放供《公约》之下的缔约方和观察员参加；

30. 请秘书处支持和便利促进工作组的工作；

31. 注意到上文第 30 段所述秘书处将开展活动所涉概算问题；

32. 请秘书处在具备资金的情况下开展本决定所要求的行动；

33. 邀请感兴趣的缔约方和组织酌情提供财政和技术支持，以促进履行地方社区和土著人民平台的职能。

第 7 次全体会议

2018 年 12 月 13 日

<sup>1</sup> 第 2/CP.23 号决定第 6(a-c)段。

<sup>2</sup> [https://unfccc.int/submissions\\_and\\_statements](https://unfccc.int/submissions_and_statements)。

## 第 3/CP.24 号决定

### 长期气候资金

缔约方会议，

忆及《公约》第四条和第十一条，

还忆及第 1/CP.16 号决定第 2、4 和 97-101 段，以及第 1/CP.17 号决定、第 2/CP.17 号决定第 126-132 段、第 4/CP.18 号决定、第 3/CP.19 号决定、第 5/CP.20 号决定、第 5/CP.21 号决定、第 7/CP.22 号决定和第 6/CP.23 号决定，

1. 赞赏地欢迎资金问题常设委员会 2018 年气候资金流量两年期评估和概览，特别是其主要结论和建议，其中强调发达国家向发展中国家提供的气候资金流量有所增加；<sup>1</sup>

2. 还赞赏地欢迎发达国家缔约方根据第 1/CP.16 号决定，在有意义的减缓行动和实施的透明度框架内，继续朝着在 2020 年之前每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标前进；

3. 忆及发达国家缔约方根据第 1/CP.16 号决定，承诺在有意义的减缓行动和实施的透明度框架内，在 2020 年之前实现每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标，以满足发展中国家缔约方的需求；敦促发达国家缔约方为争取实现这一目标继续加紧筹集气候资金；

4. 敦促发达国家缔约方继续努力将较大比例的公共气候资金导入适应活动，并争取在减缓资金和适应资金之间达成更好的平衡，同时认识到适应资金的重要性以及为适应活动提供公共资金和赠款型资金的必要性；

5. 欢迎发达国家缔约方迄今为止根据第 3/CP.19 号决定第 10 段提交的关于 2018 年至 2020 年增加气候资金的战略与方针的两年期材料；<sup>2</sup> 敦促尚未提交材料的发达国家缔约方提交这一信息；

6. 请秘书处按照第 5/CP.20 号决定第 11 段，编写上文第 5 段所述两年期材料的汇编和综述，为下文第 9 段所述会期研讨会提供参考；

7. 欢迎各缔约方在努力加强国内的扶持性环境以吸引气候资金方面所取得的进展；敦促各缔约方进一步加强本国的扶持性环境和政策框架，以根据第 3/CP.19 号决定促进筹集并有效部署气候资金；

8. 赞赏地注意到 2018 年长期气候资金问题会期研讨会的概要报告<sup>3</sup>；邀请各缔约方和有关机构考虑其中的主要信息；

9. 决定 2019 年和 2020 年长期气候资金问题会期研讨会将重点讨论：

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8，附件二。

<sup>2</sup> 见 <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>。

<sup>3</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/4。

(a) 气候资金的效力，包括提供和筹集的资金的结果和影响；

(b) 向发展中国家缔约方为将全球平均气温升幅控制在工业化前水平以上低于 2°C之内、并努力将气温升幅限制在工业化前水平以上 1.5°C之内而开展的适应和减缓行动提供财政和技术支持；

10. 请秘书处举办上文第 9 段所述会期研讨会，并编写研讨会的纪要报告，分别供缔约方会议第二十五届会议(2019 年 12 月)和第二十六届会议(2020 年 11 月)审议；

11. 又请秘书处继续确保研讨会妥为保持平衡，为此除其他外，可同时邀请公共和私营部门行为方参加，并以公平和性别平衡的方式总结研讨会上所表达的观点；

12. 欢迎根据第 3/CP.19 号决定召开的第三次气候资金问题两年期高级别部长级对话；期待缔约方会议主席关于高级别部长级对话的纪要报告，供缔约方会议第二十五届会议审议；<sup>4</sup>

13. 决定长期气候资金问题会期研讨会报告和 2020 年气候资金流量两年期评估和概览将为根据第 3/CP.19 号决定拟于 2020 年召开的第四次气候资金问题两年期高级别部长级对话提供参考。

第 10 次全体会议

2018 年 12 月 15 日

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<sup>4</sup> 根据第 7/CP.22 号决定第 16 段。

## 第 4/CP.24 号决定

### 资金问题常设委员会的报告

缔约方会议，

忆及《公约》第四条和第十一条，

又忆及第 1/CP.16 号决定第 112 段、第 2/CP.17 号决定第 120 和 121 段，以及第 5/CP.18、7/CP.19、6/CP.20、6/CP.21、8/CP.22 和 7/CP.23 号决定，

1. 赞赏地欢迎资金问题常设委员会提交《公约》缔约方会议第二十四届会议的报告，注意到其中所载的建议：<sup>1</sup>

2. 核可资金问题常设委员会 2019 年工作计划<sup>2</sup>；

3. 赞赏地欢迎资金问题常设委员会 2018 年气候资金流量两年期评估和概览，特别是附件所载摘要和建议<sup>3</sup>；

4. 鼓励资金问题常设委员会在今后的气候资金流量两年期评估和概览中考虑到现有的最佳科学知识；

5. 请资金问题常设委员会在气候资金流量两年期评估和概览中酌情使用《公约》和《巴黎协定》条款中与气候资金相关的既定术语；

6. 表示赞赏比利时、德国、挪威、大韩民国、瑞士和大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国政府以及欧洲联盟委员会为支持资金问题常设委员会的工作提供的捐款；

7. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会 2018 年关于气候资金架构主题的论坛侧重讨论加强协作和抓住机遇，并注意到论坛的纪要报告<sup>4</sup>；

8. 表示感谢荷兰、挪威和大韩民国政府为确保资金问题常设委员会 2018 年论坛取得成功提供的支持；

9. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会决定其 2019 年论坛将围绕气候资金与可持续城市这一主题展开；

10. 请资金问题常设委员会每四年梳理一次与《巴黎协定》第二条第 1 款 (c) 项有关的现有信息，包括在其中提到第九条的情况，作为其气候资金流量两年期评估和概览的一部分；

11. 鼓励资金问题常设委员会为气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制执行委员会关于资金支持来源的技术文件提供投入；<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8。

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8，附件六。

<sup>3</sup> <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018%20BA%20Technical%20Report%20Final.pdf>。

<sup>4</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8，附件三。

<sup>5</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8，第 14(g) 段。

12. 确认《公约》第十一条第 3 款(d)项以及第 12/CP.2、12/CP.3、5/CP.19 和 1/CP.21 号决定中规定的任务；

13. 请资金问题常设委员会每四年编写一份报告，说明确定发展中国家缔约方与执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》相关的需求的情况，供《公约》缔约方会议从第二十六届会议(2020 年 11 月)开始审议，并供作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议从第三届会议(2020 年 11 月)开始审议；

14. 还请资金问题常设委员会在编写以上第 13 段所述报告时，酌情与资金机制的经营实体、附属机构和组成机构、多边和双边渠道以及观察员组织开展协作；

15. 又请资金问题常设委员会在具备资金的情况下采取本决定所要求的行动；

16. 请资金问题常设委员会向《公约》缔约方会议第二十五届会议(2019 年 12 月)报告其工作计划的执行进展情况；

17. 还请资金问题常设委员会考虑《公约》缔约方会议其他相关决定为其提供的指导意见。

## Annex

### Summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows

[English only]

#### I. Context and mandates

1. The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) assists the Conference of the Parties (COP) in exercising its functions with respect to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, inter alia, in terms of measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing country Parties, through activities such as the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows (BA).<sup>1</sup>
2. Subsequent to the 2014 BA, the COP requested the SCF to consider: the relevant work of other bodies and entities on measurement, reporting and verification of support and the tracking of climate finance;<sup>2</sup> ways of strengthening methodologies for reporting climate finance;<sup>3</sup> and ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance, including private finance mobilized by public interventions, to assess how adaptation and mitigation needs can most effectively be met by climate finance.<sup>4</sup> It also requested the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, when developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support, to consider, inter alia, information in the BA and other reports of the SCF and other relevant bodies under the Convention.
3. The COP welcomed the summary and recommendations by the SCF on the 2016 BA, which, inter alia, encourages Parties and relevant international institutions to enhance the availability of information that will be necessary for tracking global progress on the goals outlined in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. The COP requested the SCF, in preparing future BAs, to assess available information on investment needs and plans related to Parties' nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans.
4. The 2018 BA provides an updated overview of climate finance flows in 2015 and 2016 from provider to beneficiary countries, available information on domestic climate finance and cooperation among Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties), and the other climate-related flows that constitute global total climate finance flows. It also includes information on trends since the 2014 BA. The 2018 BA then considers the implications of these flows and assesses their relevance to international efforts to address climate change. It explores the key features of climate finance flows, including composition and purposes. It also explores emerging insights into their effectiveness, finance access, and ownership and alignment of climate finance with beneficiary country needs and priorities related to climate change. It also provides information on recent developments in the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance flows at the international and domestic level, and insights into impact reporting practices.
5. The 2018 BA includes, for the first time, information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including methods and metrics, and data sets on flows, stocks and considerations for integration. It also discusses climate finance flows in the broader context.

<sup>1</sup> Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 121(f).

<sup>2</sup> Decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 71.

<sup>3</sup> Decision 5/CP.18, paragraph 11.

<sup>4</sup> Decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 11.



6. The 2018 BA comprises this summary and recommendations, and a technical report. The summary and recommendations was prepared by the SCF. The technical report was prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF and draws on information and data from a range of sources. It was subject to extensive stakeholder input and expert review, but remains a product of the external experts.

## II. Challenges and limitations

7. The 2018 BA provides an updated overview of current climate finance flows over the years 2015 and 2016, along with data on trends from 2011 to 2014 collated in previous BA reports. Due diligence has been undertaken to utilize the best information available from the most credible sources. In compiling estimates, efforts have been made to avoid double counting through a focus on primary finance, which is finance for a new physical item or activity. Challenges were nevertheless encountered in collecting, aggregating and analysing information from diverse sources. The lack of clarity with regard to the use of different definitions of climate finance limits the comparability of data.

8. **Data uncertainty.** There are uncertainties associated with each source of data which have different underlying causes. Uncertainties are related to the data on domestic public investments, resulting from the lack of geographic coverage, differences in the way methods are applied, significant changes in the methods for estimating energy efficiency over the years, and the lack of available data on sustainable transport and other key sectors. Uncertainties also arise from the lack of procedures and data to determine private climate finance; methods for estimating adaptation finance; differences in the assumptions of underlying formulas to attribute finance from multilateral development banks (MDBs) to members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), minus the Republic of Korea; the classification of data as ‘green finance’; and incomplete data on non-concessional flows.

9. **Data gaps.** Gaps in the coverage of sectors and sources of climate finance remain significant, particularly with regard to private investment. Although estimates of incremental investments in energy efficiency have improved, there is still an inadequate understanding of the public and private sources of finance and the financial instruments behind those investments. For sustainable transport, efforts have been made to improve public and private investment in electric vehicles. However, information on sources and instruments for finance in public mass transit remains unreported in many countries. High-quality data on private investments in mitigation and finance in sectors such as agriculture, forests, water and waste management are particularly lacking. In particular, adaptation finance estimates are difficult to compare with mitigation finance estimates due to the former being context-specific and incremental, and more work is needed on estimating climate-resilient investments.

10. The limitations outlined in paragraphs 8 and 9 above need to be taken into consideration when deriving conclusions and policy implications from the 2018 BA. The SCF will contribute, through its activities, to the progressive improvement of the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance information in future BAs to help address these challenges.

## III. Key findings

### A. Methodological issues relating to measurement, reporting and verification of public and private climate finance

#### 1. Developments in the period 2015–2016

11. Following the recommendations made by the SCF in the 2016 BA, the 2018 BA identifies the improvements listed in paragraphs 12–16 below in the tracking and reporting of information on climate finance.

**(a) Annex II Parties**

12. Revision of the biennial report (BR) common tabular format (CTF) tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) has facilitated the provision of more qualitative information on the definitions and underlying methodologies used by Parties included in Annex II to the Convention (Annex II Parties) in the documentation boxes in the BR3 CTF tables. The BR3 CTF tables submitted as at October 2018 suggest some increase in the provision of quantitative information, including information on public financial support in CTF table 7(b) and climate-related private finance in the BRs.

**(b) International organizations**

13. Making data available on private shares of climate co-finance associated with MDB finance and reporting on amounts mobilized through public interventions deployed by other development finance institutions (DFIs) included in the regular OECD-DAC data collection process.

14. Facilitating the increased transparency of information through biennial surveys to collect information from OECD-DAC members on the measurement basis for reporting (i.e. committed, disbursed or “other”), and on the shares of the activity reported as mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting to the UNFCCC.

15. Institutionalizing the mitigation and adaptation finance tracking and reporting, and ongoing efforts aimed at better tracking and reporting on projects that have mitigation and adaptation co-benefits (i.e. cross-cutting) among MDBs.

16. Measuring and reporting on impact is now common practice among multilateral climate funds, and there is now growing interest in this field by MDBs and the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), which are also undertaking work on methodologies for impact measuring in the light of the Paris Agreement. The ongoing efforts of MDBs to develop additional metrics that demonstrate how MDB financing supports climate-resilient development pathways are an important step in this direction.

**(c) Insights into reporting by Annex II Parties and non-Annex I Parties**

17. Notwithstanding the improvements in methodologies for reporting climate finance via the BR3 CTF tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b), some reporting issues persist that complicate the aggregation, comparison and analysis of the data. The current “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”<sup>5</sup> were designed to accommodate reporting on a wide range of climate finance instruments and activities. This required a reporting architecture that was flexible enough to accommodate a diversity of reporting approaches. In some cases, limited clarity with regard to the diversity of reporting approaches limits comparability in climate finance reporting.

18. The current “UNFCCC biennial update reporting guidelines for Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention”<sup>6</sup> for reporting by non-Annex I Parties on financial, technical and capacity-building needs and support received do not require information on underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used in generating the information. Nevertheless, the provision of such information is useful.

**(d) Insights into broader reporting aspects**

19. Notwithstanding ongoing efforts to make information on domestic climate-related finance available through biennial update reports (BURs), published climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, and other tools, collecting and reporting domestic climate-related finance is often not undertaken systematically, thereby limiting the availability of information.

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<sup>5</sup> Decision 2/CP.17, annex I.

<sup>6</sup> Decision 2/CP.17, annex III.

20. There are significant data gaps on climate finance flows in the context of cooperation among non-Annex I Parties.

## **2. Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: methods and metrics**

21. Ongoing voluntary efforts to develop approaches for tracking and reporting on consistency of public and private sector finance with the Paris Agreement are important for enhancing the collective understanding of the consistency of the broader finance and investment flows with Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.

22. Some financial actors, such as MDBs and bilateral DFIs, have started to develop approaches for tracking the integration of climate change considerations into their operations. However, there was no publicly available information on the progress made on this matter at the time of preparation of the 2018 BA. Ongoing work for developing climate-resilience metrics is important for enhancing understanding of the consistency of multilateral and bilateral development finance with the Paris Agreement.

## **B. Overview of current climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016**

### **1. Global finance flows**

23. On a comparable basis, climate finance flows increased by 17 per cent in the period 2015–2016 compared with the period 2013–2014. High-bound climate finance estimates increased from USD 584 billion in 2014 to USD 680 billion in 2015 and to USD 681 billion in 2016 (see figure 1). The growth seen in 2015 was largely driven by high levels of new private investment in renewable energy, which is the largest segment of the global total. Despite decreasing technology costs (particularly in solar photovoltaic and wind power generation), which means that every dollar invested finances more renewable energy than it previously did, a significant number of new projects were financed in 2015. In 2016, a decrease in renewable energy investment occurred, which was driven by both the continued decline in renewable technology costs and the lower generation capacity of new projects financed.<sup>7</sup> However, the decrease in renewable energy investment in 2016 was offset by an 8 per cent increase in investment in energy efficiency technologies across the building, industry and transport sectors.

24. The quality and completeness of data on climate finance has improved since the 2016 BA. Methodological improvements in estimating finance flows have changed the comparative basis against previous estimates. In particular, 2014 estimates for energy efficiency have been revised downward owing to a more accurate bottom-up assessment model being employed by the International Energy Agency. This has resulted in a revised estimate of USD 584 billion from USD 741 billion for total global climate finance in 2014. In addition, data coverage in sustainable transport has improved, with estimates for public and private investment in electric vehicle sales in 2015 and 2016.

#### **(a) Flows from Annex II Parties to non-Annex I Parties as reported in biennial reports**

25. Climate-specific finance reported in BRs submitted by Annex II Parties has increased in terms of both volume and rate of growth since the previous BA. Whereas the total finance reported increased by just 5 per cent from 2013 to 2014, it increased by 24 per cent from 2014 to 2015 (to USD 33 billion), and subsequently by 14 per cent from 2015 to 2016 (to USD 38 billion). Out of these total amounts, USD 30 billion in 2015 and USD 34 billion in 2016 were reported as climate-specific finance channelled through bilateral, regional and other channels; the remainder flowed through multilateral channels. From 2014 to 2016, both mitigation and adaptation finance grew in more or less equal proportions, namely by 41 and 45 per cent, respectively.

<sup>7</sup> Approximately 52 per cent of the decrease in 2016 was due to reduced technology costs in solar photovoltaic and wind energy.

**(b) Multilateral climate funds**

26. Total amounts channelled through UNFCCC funds and multilateral climate funds in 2015 and 2016 were USD 1.4 billion and USD 2.4 billion, respectively. The significant increase from 2015 to 2016 was a result of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) ramping up operations. On the whole, this represents a decrease of approximately 13 per cent compared with the 2013–2014 biennium and can be accounted for by a reduction in the commitments made by the Climate Investment Funds, in line with changes in the climate finance landscape as the GCF only started to scale up operations in 2016.

**(c) Climate finance from multilateral development banks**

27. MDBs provided USD 23.4 billion and USD 25.5 billion in climate finance from their own resources to eligible recipient countries in 2015 and 2016, respectively. On average, this represents a 3.4 per cent increase from the 2013–2014 period.

28. The attribution of MDB finance flows to members of OECD-DAC, minus the Republic of Korea, is calculated at up to USD 17.4 billion in 2015 and USD 19.7 billion in 2016 to recipients eligible for OECD-DAC official development assistance.

**(d) Private climate finance**

29. The most significant source of uncertainty relates to the geographic attribution of private finance data. Although efforts have been made by MDBs and OECD since the 2016 BA to estimate private climate finance mobilized through multilateral and bilateral institutions, data on private finance sources and destinations remain lacking.

30. MDBs reported private finance mobilization in 2015 was USD 10.9 billion and increased by 43 per cent the following year to USD 15.7 billion. OECD estimated USD 21.7 billion in climate-related private finance mobilized during the period 2012–2015 by bilateral and multilateral institutions, which included USD 14 billion from multilateral providers and USD 7.7 billion from bilateral finance institutions. It is estimated that, in 2015, USD 2.3 billion was mobilized through bilateral institutions. The Climate Policy Initiative estimated renewable energy flows for new projects ranged from USD 2.4 billion in 2015 to USD 1.5 billion in 2016; this was, however, a significant underestimation given the underlying reporting approaches.

**(e) Recipients**

31. A total of 34 Parties included in Annex I to the Convention provided information on recipients in the BR3s, while 16 out of 40 BURs submitted as first or second BURs as at October 2018 include, to varying degrees, quantitative information on climate finance received in the 2015–2016 period. Therefore, at the time of the preparation of the 2018 BA, it is not possible to present a clear picture of climate finance received on the basis of the information included in national reports submitted to the secretariat.

32. Other sources of information provide insights on recipients. For example, of the bilateral finance reported to OECD-DAC, national and local governments received 51 and 61 per cent of bilateral climate-related assistance in 2015 and 2016, up from 43 and 42 per cent in 2013 and 2014, respectively. The remainder was received by international organizations, non-governmental organizations and public and private sector organizations from the support-providing countries. No information is available on the channels of delivery for 91–97 per cent of the other official flows of a non-concessional nature in the period 2015–2016. Of the total climate finance committed by MDBs from their own resources, 72 per cent was channelled to public sector recipients in 2015, and 74 per cent in 2016. Adaptation finance, in particular, went predominantly to public sector institutions: 90 per cent in 2015 and 97 per cent in 2016.

## 2. Domestic climate finance

33. Domestic climate expenditures by national and subnational governments are a potentially growing source of global climate finance, particularly as, in some cases, NDC submissions are translated into specific investment plans and domestic efforts to monitor and track the domestic climate expenditures are stepped up. However, comprehensive data on domestic climate expenditure are not readily available, as these data are not collected regularly or with a consistent methodology over time within or across countries. Of the 30 countries that reported data on climate expenditures included in the 2016 BA, 19 countries provided such data in 2015 or 2016, with the 2015 data for 5 countries being included in the 2016 BA. Four countries reported expenditure of USD 0.335 billion in their BURs, while seven countries published climate public expenditure and institutional reviews amounting to USD 16.5 billion.<sup>8</sup> In two other countries, updated data are available amounting to USD 49 billion. In total, this brings domestic public climate finance estimates for the period 2015–2016 to USD 67 billion.


## 3. Flows among countries that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, recipients eligible for official development assistance and Parties not included in Annex I

34. Information on climate finance flows among non-Annex I Parties is not systematically tracked, relying on voluntary reporting by countries through the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and DFIs through IDFC that are based in countries that are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (non-OECD). Total estimates of such flows amounted to USD 12.2–13.9 billion in 2015 and USD 11.3–13.7 billion in 2016. This represents an increase of approximately 33 per cent on average from the 2013–2014 period, driven primarily by non-OECD member institutions of IDFC increasing finance significantly to other non-OECD members. New multilateral institutions include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank. Together, they provided USD 911 million to renewable energy projects in 2016. The AIIB portion of this amount included outflows that may be attributable to OECD-DAC members that are shareholders in AIIB.

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<sup>8</sup> This includes Hebei Province in China, reporting an expenditure of USD 6.1 billion in 2015.

Figure 1  
**Climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016**  
 (Billions of United States dollars, annualized)



		2015 (USD billion face value)	2016 (USD billion face value)	Sources of data and relevant chapter
Global total flows	<b>Renewable energy investments</b>	320.9	269.5	Chapter 2.2.1
	Public investment	61.7	52.3	CPI based on multiple sources
	Private investment	259.2	217.1	
	<b>Energy efficiency investments</b>	233.9	257.8	Chapter 2.2.2
	Public investment	25.7	32.9	IEA Energy Efficiency Market Reports/CPI
	Private investment (a)	208.2	224.9	
	<b>Sustainable transport</b>	78.0	105.8	Chapter 2.2.3
	Public investment	69.7	92.5	IEA World Energy Investment Report/CPI
	Private investment	8.3	13.3	
	<b>Other sectors public investment</b>	47.3	47.5	Chapter 2.2.2 – 2.2.5
Domestic climate-related public investment	67.0	67.0	CPI based on multiple sources	
Flows to non-Annex I Parties	<b>UNFCCC funds</b>	0.6	1.6	Chapter 2.3
	<b>Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC)</b>	1.4	2.4	Chapter 2.5.2
	Climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels	29.9	33.6	Fund financial reports, CFU
	<b>MDB climate finance attributed (b)</b>	17.4	19.7	Chapter 2.5.2
	Renewable energy projects	2.4	1.5	Chapter 2.5.4
	Mobilized private climate finance by MDB (c)	10.9	15.7	CPI based on multiple sources
	Mobilized private climate finance by bilateral, regional institutions (c)	2.3		Chapter 2.5.4
			MDB Joint Reports	
			Chapter 2.5.4	
			OECD	

*Abbreviations:* BEV = battery electric vehicle, BUR = biennial update report, CPEIR = climate public expenditure and institutional reviews, CPI = Climate Policy Initiative, IEA = International Energy Agency, I4CE = Institute for Climate Economics, MDB = multilateral development bank, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.

<sup>a</sup> Value discounts transport energy efficiency estimates by 8.5 per cent to account for overlap with electric vehicle estimates.

<sup>b</sup> From members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), minus the Republic of Korea, to OECD-DAC recipients eligible for official development assistance. Refer to chapter 2.5.2 of the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report for further explanation.

<sup>c</sup> Estimates include private co-financing with MDB finance.

#### 4. Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: data sets on flows, stocks and integration

35. The 2018 BA includes information on available data sets that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes and that include information that may be relevant to tracking consistency with Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.

36. Across the financial sector, both the reporting of data on financial flows and stocks consistent with low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient pathways, and the integration of climate considerations into decision-making are at a nascent stage. The data sets available on bond markets are the most advanced, with regular and reliable data published based on green bond labelling and analysis of bonds that may be aligned with climate themes. Less information is available on bonds that may be inconsistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathways. Other market segments lack completeness of coverage and reporting quality across peer institutions. With regard to integrating climate change considerations into investment decision-making, some market segments such as listed corporations and institutional investors are participating in emerging reporting initiatives, including through target-setting processes, that will likely improve the availability of data over time. Other market segments such as insurance companies participate in comprehensive and regular survey reporting on climate integration into governance and risk-management processes. Other market segments, particularly in banking, insurance and financial services, lack breadth of coverage in reporting or are at an early stage of considering how to report data.

### C. Assessment of climate finance flows

37. An assessment of the data underlying the overview of climate finance flows presented offers insights into crucial questions of interest in the context of the objective of the Convention and the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement. Development banks, DFIs and multilateral climate funds play a vital role in helping countries to deliver on their NDCs. The key features of a subset of these different channels of public climate finance for beneficiary countries are summarized in the figure below, including the areas of support (adaptation, mitigation or cross-cutting) and the instruments used to deliver climate finance.

Figure 2

#### Characteristics of international public climate finance flows in the period 2015–2016

	Annual average USD billion	Area of support				Financial instrument		
		Adaptation	Mitigation	REDD-plus <sup>a</sup>	Cross-cutting	Grants	Concessional loans	Other
Multilateral climate funds <sup>b</sup>	1.9	25%	53%	5%	17%	51%	44%	5%
Bilateral climate finance <sup>c</sup>	31.7	29%	50%	–	21%	47%	52%	<1%
MDB climate finance <sup>d</sup>	24.4	21%	79%	–	–	9%	74%	17%

*Note:* All values are based on approvals and commitments.

*Abbreviations:* MDB = multilateral development bank.

<sup>a</sup> In decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, the Conference of the Parties encouraged developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities: reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

<sup>b</sup> Including Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme, Adaptation Fund, Bio Carbon Fund, Clean Technology Fund, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program, Global Climate Change Alliance, Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, Green Climate Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, Partnership for Market Readiness, Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience, Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, Special Climate Change Fund and United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries.

<sup>c</sup> Bilateral climate finance data are sourced from biennial reports from Parties included in Annex II to the Convention (that further include regional and other channels) for the annual average. Information related to the United States of America is drawn from preliminary data provided by the United States. The thematic split and the financial instrument data are taken from data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), referring only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD-DAC members. Section C of the summary and recommendations and chapter III of the technical report uses 'bilateral finance' to refer only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD-DAC members.

<sup>d</sup> The annual average and thematic split of MDBs includes their own resources only, while the financial instrument data include data from MDBs and from external resources, due to the lack of data disaggregation.

38. Overall, trends in climate finance point to increasing flows towards beneficiary countries. Bilateral climate finance flows, and those channelled through MDBs, have increased since the 2016 BA, whereas flows from the multilateral climate funds have fluctuated, having decreased in 2015 before rebounding in 2016, although the average remains lower than in the 2013–2014 period, which reflects changes in the climate finance landscape.

39. When considering these flows in aggregate, support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation across all sources (noting, however, measurement differences). Bilateral finance flows from OECD-DAC providers had the greatest proportion intended for adaptation (29 per cent) in the period 2015–2016, followed by multilateral climate funds (25 per cent) and MDBs (21 per cent). However, the 2018 BA finds an increase in public climate finance flows that contributes towards both adaptation and mitigation from both bilateral contributors and multilateral climate funds. This makes it more difficult to track the progress made in ramping up adaptation finance. When, however, considering flows based on other groupings, there are variations in the composition of the types of support.

40. Grants continue to be a key instrument for the provision of adaptation finance. In the period 2015–2016 grants accounted for 62 and 94 per cent of the face value of bilateral adaptation finance reported to OECD and of adaptation finance from the multilateral climate funds, respectively. During the same period, 9 per cent of adaptation finance flowing through MDBs was grant-based. Mitigation finance remains less concessional in nature, with 25 per cent of bilateral flows, 31 per cent of multilateral climate fund approvals and 4 per cent of MDB investments taking the form of grants. These figures, however, may not fully capture the added value brought by combining different types of financial instruments, or technical assistance with capital flows, which can often lead to greater innovation or more sustainable implementation.

41. With regard to geographic distribution, Asia remains the principal recipient region of public climate finance flows. In the period 2015–2016, the region received 31 per cent of funding from multilateral climate funds, 42 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD and 41 per cent of MDB flows (including to the Pacific region). The Latin America and Caribbean region and sub-Saharan Africa each secured 22 per cent of approvals from the multilateral climate funds in the same period. Latin America and the Caribbean received 17 per cent of MDB financing and 10 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD, whereas sub-Saharan Africa received just 9 per cent of MDB financing but 30 per cent of bilateral finance reported to OECD.

42. With regard to flows to the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) in the period 2015–2016, funding directed at the LDCs represented 24 per cent of bilateral flows, whereas that directed at SIDS accounted for 2 per cent of such flows. Of the bilateral finance provided to the LDCs and SIDS, around half was earmarked for adaptation. Similarly, 21 per cent of finance approved by multilateral climate funds went to the LDCs and 13 per cent to SIDS, and more than half of this finance was focused on adaptation. MDBs channelled 15 per cent of their climate finance to the LDCs and SIDS. The percentage of adaptation spending to these countries (41 per cent) is twice their climate finance spending overall.

43. The management of climate finance, as well as the development and implementation of the projects that it supports, necessarily entails costs. The degree of such costs, which are often recovered through mechanisms such as administrative budgets and implementing agency fees, varies across institutions. Among the major multilateral climate change funds, fees account for between 1 and 9 per cent of total fund value, ranging from USD 65,000 to USD 1.2 million per project. Although these costs tend to decrease over time as management and disbursement mechanisms become more streamlined, there is evidence to suggest that the alignment of administrative functions between funds (e.g. the Global Environment Facility administration of the Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund) offers the best opportunity to keep administrative costs down. This is essential in order to retain the trust that providers and recipients place in the funds.



44. The push to diversify modalities of access to climate finance continues. Institutions in beneficiary countries are increasingly able to meet fiduciary and environmental and social safeguard requirements for accessing funds. There has been a notable increase in the number of regional and national implementing entities to the multilateral climate funds, despite large amounts remaining programmed through multilateral entities.

45. Ownership remains a critical factor in the delivery of effective climate finance. A broad concept of ownership encompasses the consistency of climate finance with national priorities, the degree to which national systems are used for both spending and tracking, and the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. There have been a number of efforts to build capacity to access and make strategic choices about how to use finance and oversee implementation. With regard to the role of governments, while there has been greater commitment by ministries of finance and planning to integrate climate finance into national budgetary planning, this is often not done fully. National-level institutions in beneficiary countries are playing a greater role in managing climate finance, particularly through domestic tracking systems. NDCs for which further financial resources need to be found are emerging as a platform that governments can use to stimulate engagement and strengthen national ownership of climate finance.

46. Mechanisms for monitoring the impact of climate finance have improved, albeit not uniformly. Thus, although the reporting of results (in terms of outputs) has increased, it is difficult to assess properly the quality of the impacts achieved (i.e. outcomes). These impacts are, moreover, presented in a multitude of formats. The reduction of GHG emissions remains the primary impact metric for climate change mitigation. Core mitigation-related multilateral funds are expected to reduce GHG emissions by over 11 billion tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (t CO<sub>2</sub> eq), with reported reductions already approaching 37 million t CO<sub>2</sub> eq. GHG reduction results are complemented by other quantitative data, such as the number of beneficiaries and the renewable energy capacity installed. The metrics, benchmarks and frameworks for monitoring the impact of mitigation projects continue to evolve, thereby helping to inform investment decisions.

47. Discussion on impact measurement of adaptation projects continues to be focused on the number and type of people that benefit from them, although the nature and extent of their beneficial effects are still difficult to quantify, both directly and indirectly. Adaptation finance channelled through core multilateral climate funds has so far reached over 20 million direct beneficiaries. The target for the combined number of direct and indirect beneficiaries is 290 million. Further work is necessary to develop adaptation and resilience metrics that can capture the whole spectrum of sectors receiving support and the many different approaches used, while allowing for aggregation of data and comparability between projects and funds.


48. The extent of co-financing remains important for the mobilization of private finance, but is challenged in terms of the availability of data, definitions and methods. Research suggests that multilateral climate funds can perform on a par with DFIs with regard to private co-financing ratios. The degree to which such finance can be mobilized, however, is often heavily influenced by the investment conditions in a country, which are in turn created by the policy and regulatory frameworks in place.

#### **Information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement: climate finance in context**

49. Climate finance continues to account for just a small proportion of overall finance flows (see figure 3); the level of climate finance is considerably below what one would expect given the investment opportunities and needs that have been identified. However, although climate finance flows must obviously be scaled up, it is also important to ensure the consistency of finance flows as a whole (and of capital stock) pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement. This does not mean that all finance flows have to achieve explicitly beneficial climate outcomes, but that they must reduce the likelihood of negative climate outcomes. Although commitments are being made to ensure that finance flows from DFIs are climate consistent, more can be done to understand public finance flows and ensure that they are all consistent with countries' climate change and sustainable development objectives.

50. Awareness of climate risk in the financial sector has increased over the past few years. Positive developments are being seen in the sector, particularly with regard to the investment and lending policies of both public and private sector actors, and with regard to regulatory and fiscal policies and the information resources that guide decision-making.

Figure 3  
Climate finance in context



*Note:* All flows are global and annual for 2016 unless stated otherwise. Energy investment needs are modelled under a 2 °C scenario. The representation of stocks that overlap is not necessarily reflective of real-world overlaps. The flows represented are not representative of all flows contributing to the stocks presented. Data points are provided to place climate finance in context and do not represent an aggregate or systematic view. Climate finance flows are those represented in section B of the Summary and Recommendations and as reported in chapter 2 of the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report. Investment in renewable energy overlaps with this estimate of climate finance flows.

*Source:* See figure 3.9 in the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows technical report.

## IV. Recommendations

51. The SCF invites the COP to consider the following recommendations:

### Chapter I (methodologies)

(a) *Request* developed country Parties and *encourage* developing country Parties, building on progress made so far and ongoing work, to continue enhancing the transparency, consistency and comparability of data on climate finance provided and mobilized through public interventions, and taking into consideration developments in relevant organizations and institutions;

(b) *Encourage* Parties providing climate finance to enhance their reporting of climate finance provided to developing country Parties;

(c) *Invite* Parties, through their board memberships in international financial institutions, to encourage continued efforts in the harmonization of methodologies for tracking and reporting climate finance among international organizations;

(d) *Encourage* developing country Parties, building on progress made so far and ongoing work, to consider, as appropriate, enhancing their reporting on the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used in generating information on financial, technical and capacity-building needs and support received;

### Chapter II (overview)

(e) *Encourage* Parties, building on progress made so far, to enhance their tracking and reporting on climate finance flows from all sources;

(f) *Encourage* developing country Parties that provide support to report information on climate finance provided to other developing country Parties;

(g) *Encourage* developed countries and climate finance providers, as well as multilateral and financial institutions, private finance data providers and other relevant institutions, to enhance the availability of granular, country-level data on mitigation and adaptation finance, inter alia, transport, agriculture, forests, water and waste;

(h) *Invite* private sector associations and financial institutions to build on the progress made on ways to improve data on climate finance and to engage with the SCF, including through their participation in the forums of the SCF with a view to enhancing the quality of the BA;

(i) *Request* the SCF to continue its work in the mapping of available data sets that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes, and to include information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement in future BAs;

### Chapter III (assessment)

(j) *Invite* Parties to strive for complementarity between climate finance and sustainable development by, inter alia, aligning climate finance with national climate change frameworks and priorities, as well as broader economic development policies and national budgetary planning;

(k) *Encourage* developing countries to take advantage of available resources through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to strengthen institutional capacity for programming their priority climate action, as well as tracking climate finance, effectiveness and impacts;

(l) *Encourage* developed countries and climate finance providers to continue to enhance country ownership and consider policies to balance funding for adaptation and mitigation, taking into account beneficiary country strategies, and, in line with the mandates, building on experiences, policies and practices of the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, particularly the GCF;

(m) *Encourage* climate finance providers to improve tracking and reporting on gender-related aspects of climate finance, impact measuring and mainstreaming;

(n) *Invite*, as in the 2016 BA, multilateral climate funds, MDBs, other financial institutions and relevant international organizations to continue to advance work on tracking and reporting on impacts of mitigation and adaptation finance;

(o) *Encourage* all relevant United Nations agencies and international, regional and national financial institutions to provide information to Parties through the secretariat on how their development assistance and climate finance programmes incorporate climate-proofing and climate-resilience measures, in line with new available scientific information;

(p) *Request* the SCF, in preparing future BAs, to continue assessing available information on the alignment of climate finance with investment needs and plans related to Parties' NDCs and national adaptation plans;

(q) *Request* the SCF, in preparing the 2020 BA, to take into consideration available information relevant to Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.

*10<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting  
15 December 2018*

## 第 5/CP.24 号决定

### 绿色气候基金提交缔约方会议的报告和对绿色气候基金的指导意见

缔约方会议，

注意到资金问题常设委员会编写的对绿色气候基金的指导意见草案<sup>1</sup>，

忆及第 10/CP.22 号决定第 5 段，

1. 欢迎绿色气候基金提交缔约方会议第二十四届会议的报告及增编，包括绿色气候基金董事会(下称“董事会”)为响应缔约方会议提出的指导意见而采取的行动清单<sup>2</sup>；

2. 还欢迎绿色气候基金 2018 年取得的进展，其中包括：

(a) 董事会批准的资金已经达到 55 亿美元，包括近三年为在 96 个发展中国家执行 93 项适应和减缓供资建议书所提供的 46 亿美元贷款、赠款、股权和担保；

(b) 为加强绿色气候基金在气候资金领域的机构能力、标准和保障机制、透明度、包容性、管道和作用而开展的工作；

(c) 董事会关于启动绿色气候基金业绩审查，以评估基金在履行其管理文书规定的任务方面所获进展的决定<sup>3</sup>；

(d) 董事会关于绿色气候基金秘书处执行主任甄选和任命程序的决定<sup>4</sup>；

(e) 董事会关于选择和任命国际复兴开发银行为绿色气候基金受托人的决定；

(f) 通过结构化对话以及准备和筹备支助方案，为改善绿色气候基金的获取所做的努力；

(g) 获得董事会认证的实体数目增加，包括直接获取资金的实体数目增加；

(h) 实施简化审批程序，包括迄今批准了总额为 3,010 万美元的 4 个绿色气候基金供资项目；

(i) 2018 年绿色气候基金与技术执行委员会以及气候技术中心和网络开展的合作；

(j) 董事会关于 2019 年财务规划的决定<sup>5</sup>，以及拨款 6 亿美元用于资助为响应建议书征集请求而提交的项目和试点方案，征集建议书的领域包括：关于

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8，附件四。

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/5 和 Add.1。

<sup>3</sup> 绿色气候基金董事会第 B.21/17 号决定。

<sup>4</sup> 绿色气候基金董事会第 B.21/06 号决定。

<sup>5</sup> 绿色气候基金董事会第 B.21/14 号决定。

REDD+基于成果支付、大规模筹集资金、微型企业和中小企业、强化直接获取和简化审批程序；

(k) 关于与绿色气候基金和其他气候资金渠道的互补性和一致性的第一份年度报告；

3. 又欢迎 2018 年工作计划执行情况报告，以及董事会 2019 年工作计划获得核准，促请董事会处理其余的政策空白，包括基金管理文书及议事规则中规定领域的政策空白：

(a) 以下方面的政策：

(一) 供资建议书的批准，包括项目和方案资格及遴选标准、增量成本、联合供资、优惠、方案办法、重组和撤销；

(二) 所禁止的做法及执行反洗钱政策和打击资助恐怖主义行为的政策；

(b) 认证框架审评；

(c) 为绿色气候基金寻求特权和豁免；

(d) 考虑替代性政策方法，例如关于综合可持续管理森林的联合减缓和适应方法<sup>6</sup>；

(e) 按照董事会第 B.18/03 号决定，征集支持气候技术孵化器和加速器的建议书；

4. 促请董事会按照基金管理文书的规定继续审议在尽一切努力依然无法达成共识的情况下通过决定的程序；

5. 欢迎首次正式充资进程启动以及董事会关于与基金充资有关的投入和进程的各项决定<sup>7</sup>，这些决定考虑到发展中国家的需要；

6. 强调迫切需要达成第一次正式充资进程的认捐承诺，以期于 2019 年 10 月完成该进程；

7. 注意到对准备和筹备支助方案的独立评价，并鼓励董事会根据管理文书第 59 段处理其建议，以期改善绿色气候基金的获取，并加强基金在支持国家自主权和国家方案编制方面的工作；

8. 重申须重点关注执行工作，根据商定的付款时间表，加紧向已批准的项目付款，这是绿色气候基金业务的一项关键内容；

9. 邀请缔约方最晚在缔约方会议第二十五届会议(2019 年 12 月)10 个星期之前，通过提交材料门户网站<sup>8</sup> 就制订对董事会的指导意见要考虑到的因素向秘书处提出意见和建议；

10. 请资金问题常设委员会在编写供缔约方会议审议的对董事会的指导意见草案时，考虑到上文第 9 段所述的提交材料；

<sup>6</sup> 第 16/CP.21 号决定第 6 段和第 7/CP.21 号决定第 25 段。

<sup>7</sup> 绿色气候基金董事会第 B.21/18 号决定。

<sup>8</sup> [https://unfccc.int/submissions\\_and\\_statements](https://unfccc.int/submissions_and_statements)。

11. 还请董事会在向缔约方会议提交的年度报告中提供资料，说明为执行本决定中提出的指导意见而采取的步骤；

12. 决定根据第 1/CP.21 号决定第 61 段，向绿色气候基金转交第 3/CMA.1 号决定第 4 段所述决定中所载的作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议提出的指导意见。

第 10 次全体会议  
2018 年 12 月 15 日

## 第 6/CP.24 号决定

### 全球环境基金提交缔约方会议的报告和对全球环境基金的指导意见

缔约方会议，

注意到资金问题常设委员会编写的对全球环境基金的指导意见草案，<sup>1</sup>

1. 欢迎全球环境基金向缔约方会议提交的报告及其增编，<sup>2</sup> 包括全球环境基金对缔约方会议的指导意见作出的回应；

2. 还欢迎全球环境基金第七次充资(2018 年 7 月至 2022 年 6 月)；

3. 关切地认识到，与第六次充资相比，对气候变化重点领域，包括对透明资源分配系统的拨款有所减少；

4. 促请尚未为全球环境基金第七次充资认捐的所有缔约方尽快认捐；

5. 确认在全球环境基金第七次充资中，气候变化优先事项进一步纳入其他重点领域和影响方案，并更加注重创新和加强与其他重点领域的协同作用；

6. 重点指出在全球环境基金第七次充资的影响方案中加强国家自主权的重要性；

7. 请全球环境基金酌情确保有效妥善遵循其关于审议和审查供资建议书的政策和程序；

8. 期待在第七次充资期内预计将减少的温室气体排放，这是第六次充资期计划量的两倍；

9. 肯定全球环境基金最新的共同筹资政策，<sup>3</sup> 该政策提出了全球环境基金总体资金组合达到增加共同筹资占其项目供资比例的目标；

10. 认识到全球环境基金在审查个别项目和方案时没有规定最低门槛和/或共同筹资或投资的具体类型或来源；<sup>4</sup>

11. 欢迎在全球环境基金第七次充资中纳入对透明度能力建设倡议的支持，这提高了该倡议的资金的可预测性；

12. 请全球环境基金继续管理透明度能力建设倡议，根据透明度能力建设倡议的方案规划指示中所载的优先支助事项，为不同国家和区域提供资金，同时考虑到每个国家的能力；<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/8，附件五。

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/CP/2018/6 和 Add.1。

<sup>3</sup> 全球环境基金理事会第 GEF/C.54/10/Rev.01 号决定。

<sup>4</sup> 全球环境基金 GEF/C.54/10/Rev.01 号文件附件一第 5 段。

<sup>5</sup> 全球环境基金 GEF/C.50/06 号文件第 26 段。



13. 邀请全球环境基金在其向缔约方会议提交的报告中加强关于技术转让的波兹南战略方案气候技术和资金中心与气候技术中心和网络之间合作成果的信息；

14. 请全球环境基金继续监测全球环境基金伙伴关系的地域和专题覆盖范围以及效力、效率和参与情况，并酌情考虑让更多国家和地区实体参与；

15. 欢迎设立私营部门咨询小组；

16. 鼓励私营部门咨询小组的成员在性别和地域覆盖范围方面实现平衡；

17. 欢迎全球环境基金理事会决定<sup>6</sup> 开始制定更好的信托标准，包括反洗钱和反恐怖主义资金政策，并请全球环境基金在向缔约方会议第二十五届会议(2019年12月)提交的报告中列入这项工作的最新情况；

18. 请全球环境基金审查并在必要时更新或通过关于防止性骚扰和滥用权力的政策，以保护全球环境基金秘书处及其伙伴组织的工作人员免遭不受欢迎的性挑逗，防止不当行为和滥用权力，并为报告此类事件提供指导方针；

19. 邀请缔约方最晚在缔约方会议第二十五届会议 10 个星期之前，通过提交材料门户网站<sup>7</sup> 就制订对全球环境基金的指导意见要考虑到因素提出意见和建议；

20. 请资金问题常设委员会在编写供缔约方会议审议的对全球环境基金的指导意见草案时，考虑到上文第 19 段所述的提交材料；

21. 还请全球环境基金在向缔约方会议提交的年度报告中提供资料，说明为执行本决定中提出的指导意见而采取的步骤；

22. 决定根据第 1/CP.21 号决定第 61 段，向全球环境基金转交第 3/CMA.1 号决定第 4 段所述决定中所载的作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议提供的指导意见。

第 10 次全体会议

2018 年 12 月 15 日

<sup>6</sup> 全球环境基金第 GEF/C.54/09/Rev.01 号决定。

<sup>7</sup> [https://unfccc.int/submissions\\_and\\_statements](https://unfccc.int/submissions_and_statements)。

## 第 7/CP.24 号决定

### 实施应对措施的影响问题论坛在《公约》之下的模式、工作方案和职能

缔约方会议，

忆及《公约》第四条，

还忆及《京都议定书》第二条和第三条第 14 款，

重申《巴黎协定》第四条第 15 款，

忆及第 1/CP.16、2/CP.17、8/CP.17、1/CP.21 和 11/CP.21 号决定，

认识到缔约方不仅可能受到气候变化的影响，而且还可能受到为应对气候变化而采取的措施的影响，

承认应对气候变化的措施既有积极影响，也有消极影响，

还承认应在向低温室气体排放和气候适应型发展转型的大背景下理解应对措施，

重申缔约方应开展合作，促进建立支持性和包容性的国际经济体系，实现所有缔约方可持续的经济增长和发展，

1. 回顾第 5/CMP.7 号决定第 4 段和第 1/CP.21 号决定第 33 段，其中除其他外决定，实施应对措施的影响问题论坛也应为《京都议定书》和《巴黎协定》服务；

2. 通过第 7/CMA.1 号决定附件所载的实施应对措施的影响问题论坛的模式、工作方案和职能，用于论坛在《公约》之下开展的工作；

3. 承认在所有涉及实施应对措施的影响相关问题上，只有一个论坛涵盖《公约》缔约方会议、作为《京都议定书》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议的工作；

4. 确认实施应对措施的影响问题论坛应继续就属于《公约》第四条第 8 款和第 10 款范围内的事项向缔约方会议报告，论坛在这些事项上需要缔约方会议作出指导。

第 10 次全体会议

2018 年 12 月 15 日

## 第 8/CP.24 号决定

### 国家适应计划

缔约方会议，

回顾第 1/CP.16、3/CP.17、5/CP.17、12/CP.18、18/CP.19、3/CP.20、1/CP.21、4/CP.21 和 6/CP.22 号决定，

承认国家适应计划制订和执行进程的进展有助于提高适应能力、加强复原力和减少对气候变化的脆弱性，

1. 承认发展中国家缔约方在国家适应计划的制订和执行进程中取得了进展，各国处于这一进程的不同阶段；<sup>1</sup>

2. 还承认在实现国家适应计划制订和执行进程的目标以帮助将适应工作纳入发展规划方面，已经取得了进展；

3. 又承认有关信息尚不充分，无法评估国家适应计划的制订和执行进程在多大程度上正减少对气候变化的脆弱性、加强复原力和建设适应能力；

4. 注意到以往适应工作的经验(特别是关于国家适应行动方案的经验)为国家适应计划的制订和执行进程提供了许多教益；

5. 确认事实证明，使用基于进程的方法来制订和执行国家适应计划是一种良好做法，因为这种方法侧重于长期和反复的能力开发、侧重于扶持性的环境、机构和政策，还侧重于通过项目和方案来实施具体行动；

6. 还确认从各种气候冲击中学到的知识十分宝贵，有助于加深对脆弱性和风险的理解，也有助于找出最能挽救生命和生计的适应行动；

7. 欢迎哥伦比亚、圣卢西亚和多哥在国家适应计划中心网<sup>2</sup> 提交各自的国家适应计划，使已提交的国家适应计划的总数达到了 11 项，并再次邀请<sup>3</sup> 缔约方将与国家适应计划制订和执行进程有关的产出和成果提交国家适应计划中心网，或酌情通过其他途径提交；

8. 确认缔约方宜对国家、次国家和地方层面努力开展的适应行动进行监测和评估，以增进对适应进展的了解；

9. 注意到已在绿色气候基金、最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金下向发展中国家缔约方提供了用于国家适应计划制订和执行进程的资金，其他双边、多边和国内支助渠道也为扶持发展中国家推进国家适应计划制订和执行进程方面的工作做出了重大贡献；

<sup>1</sup> 发展中国家缔约方已采取措施的概要，见 FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.13 号文件，表 4。

<sup>2</sup> <http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/Pages/national-adaptation-plans.aspx>。

<sup>3</sup> 第 3/CP.20 号决定，第 9 段。

10. 欣见截至 2018 年 12 月 4 日, 绿色气候基金秘书处已在绿色气候基金准备和筹备支持方案下批准了 22 项来自发展中国家的建议书, 用以支持制订国家适应计划和(或)其他适应规划进程, 总金额达 8,100 万美元, 其中 6 项来自最不发达国家, 金额达 1,500 万美元;

11. 还欣见截至 2018 年 9 月 30 日, 最不发达国家基金已批准 11 项来自最不发达国家的建议书, 用以资助国家适应计划制订和执行进程, 总金额达 5,500 万美元;

12. 注意到酌情让非缔约方利害关系方参与国家适应计划制订和执行进程的价值, 这些利害关系方包括民间社会、私营部门、金融机构、城市和其他次国家级主管部门, 以及地方社区和土著人民;

13. 还赞赏地注意到适应委员会召开的关于促进农业食品部门参与抵御气候变化的研讨会;<sup>4</sup>

14. 欢迎适应委员会和最不发达国家专家组在各自与绿色气候基金合作探讨如何加强为国家适应计划的制订和执行获得支助的进程<sup>5</sup>方面取得的进展, 并鼓励继续开展这种合作;

15. 赞赏地注意到相关组织在就国家适应计划制订和执行进程向各国提供技术支持方面开展的工作;

16. 注意到与国家适应计划制订和执行进程有关的差距和需要仍然存在;<sup>6</sup>

17. 请最不发达国家专家组在其现有任务和工作计划范围内, 审议已通过最不发达国家专家组和适应委员会相关工作查明的与国家适应计划制订和执行进程有关的差距和需要及如何解决这些差距和需要, 并将相关信息纳入其提交附属履行机构第五十一届会议(2019 年 12 月)的报告;

18. 还请适应委员会通过其国家适应计划工作组, 在其现有任务和工作计划范围内, 审议已通过最不发达国家专家组和适应委员会相关工作查明的差距和需要及如何解决这些差距和需要, 并将相关信息纳入其 2019 年年度报告;

19. 又请附属履行机构在第五十五届会议(2021 年 11 月)上具体说明为评估国家适应计划制订和执行进程的进展所需采取的行动和步骤, 以期不迟于 2025 年启动该评估并注意到第一次全球盘点的计划;

20. 注意到脆弱性和风险评估在确定优先事项、绘制情景和了解适应行动的执行进展方面具有重要意义, 还注意到关于气候变化影响、脆弱性和适应的内罗毕工作方案的伙伴组织开展了重要工作, 就了解脆弱性和风险的基线与发展情况的方法向发展中国家提供了信息;

21. 欢迎世界气象组织和其他相关组织努力在气候数据分析方面以及在脆弱性和风险评估中绘制和应用气候变化情景方面酌情向发展中国家提供能力建设;

<sup>4</sup> 见 <https://unfccc.int/node/182503>。

<sup>5</sup> 第 6/CP.22 号决定, 第 7 段。

<sup>6</sup> FCCC/SBI/2018/6, 第 29-32 段。

22. 鼓励相关组织继续协调与国家适应计划制订和执行进程有关的支助，并继续分享经验教训；

23. 邀请缔约方通过国家适应计划中心网的在线问卷<sup>7</sup> 或酌情通过其他途径继续提供信息，说明在实现国家适应计划制订和执行进程的目标方面取得的进展以及国家适应计划制订和执行进程中的经验教训、最佳做法、差距和需要及提供和得到的支助。

第 7 次全体会议  
2018 年 12 月 13 日

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Pages/assessingprogress.aspx>。

## 第 9/CP.24 号决定

### 适应委员会的报告

缔约方会议，

1. 欢迎适应委员会的报告<sup>1</sup>，包括其中载列的建议和委员会 2019-2021 年弹性工作计划；
2. 赞赏地注意到适应委员会在执行 2016-2018 年工作计划<sup>2</sup> 方面取得的进展；
3. 欢迎作为适应的技术审查进程的一部分举行的适应问题技术专家会议<sup>3</sup>，以及关于加强有关脆弱生态系统、社区和群体的适应规划的机遇和备选办法的技术文件<sup>4</sup>；
4. 表示赞赏主持和参加了适应问题技术专家会议、或者组织了 2018 年适应问题区域技术专家会议的缔约方和各组织；
5. 鼓励缔约方和各组织在规划和实施适应行动时借鉴 2018 年举行的区域技术专家会议的成果，并在 2019 年继续组织此类会议，以期加强适应行动及其总体一致性；
6. 还鼓励缔约方加强适应规划，包括为此参与国家适应计划制订和执行进程，同时考虑到与联合国可持续发展目标的联系以及减缓和适应之间可能的共同效益，并将适应纳入发展规划的主流；
7. 促请缔约方和非缔约方利害关系方考虑到现有指导意见<sup>5</sup>，将性别考虑因素纳入其适应规划进程的所有阶段，包括国家适应计划和适应行动的执行工作；
8. 鼓励缔约方采用参与式方法开展适应规划和执行工作，以便采纳利害关系方的意见，包括来自私营部门、民间社会、土著人民、地方社区、移民、儿童和青年、残疾人和一般弱势群体的意见；
9. 还鼓励缔约方采用迭接方法开展适应规划、执行和投资，以实现转型变革的长期目标，确保适应灵活、有力，不致适应不当，并能至少定期纳入现有最佳科学；
10. 又鼓励缔约方考虑并酌情利用各种适应规划方法，包括基于社区的适应、基于生态系统的适应、生计和经济多样化以及基于风险的方法，并确保这些方法不相互排斥，而是相辅相成，以便在增强适应力方面发挥协同作用；

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/SB/2018/3。

<sup>2</sup> 载于 FCCC/SB/2012/3 号文件，附件二。

<sup>3</sup> 见 <http://tep-a.org>。

<sup>4</sup> FCCC/TP/2018/3。

<sup>5</sup> 见 FCCC/TP/2016/2 号文件。

11. 邀请《公约》之下的相关机构和非缔约方利害关系方加强对适应规划的支持(资金、技术、科技和能力建设支持),包括在收集气候数据和信息方面加强支持,同时指出迫切需要采取适应行动来应对当前、短期和长期的气候变化风险;

12. 还邀请缔约方和感兴趣的组织分享案例研究,介绍以生态系统和适应规划为重点、促进脆弱社区和群体成为变革推动者的举措;

13. 请在关于气候变化影响、脆弱性和适应的内罗毕工作方案的适应知识门户网站上传播上文第 12 段提到的案例研究,以期促进将知识转化为实践;

14. 邀请缔约方和从事国家适应目标和指标方面工作的相关实体加强与可持续发展目标的监测系统和《2015-2030 年仙台减少灾害风险框架》的监测系统的联系,同时考虑到:

(a) 必须根据一国的总体适应目标设计适应监测和评估系统,并在制定方法时考虑定量和定性指标的利弊;

(b) 虽然全面彻底地统一《2030 年可持续发展议程》、《2015-2030 年仙台减少灾害风险框架》和《巴黎协定》可能不可行或没有用处,但一定程度的协同作用可能是有益的;

(c) 对于许多国家而言,提高个人和机构收集数据和评估适应情况的技术能力是一项持续不断的任务,提高能力有助于在国家层面将上文第 14(b)段提及的三项全球议程的相关数据收集和报告系统联系起来;

(d) 加强协调可减少各国的报告负担,并提高贯穿三项全球议程的措施的成本效益;

(e) 国家以下层级的监测和评价方案应与国家一级的监测和评价系统挂钩,以反映适应行动的全貌;

15. 关切地注意到适应委员会可用资源不足,需要补充资金,还注意到秘书处根据第 1/CP.21 号决定有待开展的活动所涉估计预算问题<sup>6</sup>;

16. 鼓励缔约方为适应委员会提供充足的资源,以便委员会成功、及时地执行 2019-2021 年工作计划;

17. 请秘书处在具备资金的情况下采取本决定所要求的行动。

第 12 次全体会议

2018 年 12 月 15 日

<sup>6</sup> 关于捐款情况的信息,可查阅 FCCC/SBI/2018/INF.12 号文件;关于预算执行情况的信息,可查阅 FCCC/SBI/2018/16 号文件。

## 第 10/CP.24 号决定

### 气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制执行委员会的报告

缔约方会议，

忆及第 3/CP.18、2/CP.19 和 2/CP.20 号决定，

还忆及《巴黎协定》第八条，

又忆及第 4/CP.22 号决定，其中建议于 2019 年对气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制进行一次审查，并作为对审查的投入编写一份技术文件，还建议附属机构在它们的第五十届会议(2019 年 6 月)上最后确定该次审查的职权范围，

忆及第 5/CP.23 号决定，其中邀请各缔约方、有关组织和其他利害关系方在 2019 年 2 月 1 日前提交意见和投入，说明审查的职权范围应包括的可能内容，供附属机构 2019 年 6 月的届会审议，

注意到政府间气候变化专门委员会关于全球温升 1.5°C 的特别报告，<sup>1</sup>

1. 欢迎：

(a) 气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制执行委员会的年度报告；<sup>2</sup>

(b) 执行委员会在执行五年期滚动工作计划方面所取得的进展；<sup>3</sup>

(c) 流离失所问题工作组的报告<sup>4</sup> 以及该工作组为响应第 1/CP.21 号决定第 49 段的要求对与气候变化有关的广义流离失所问题所做的全面评估；

(d) 苏瓦专家对话的报告，<sup>5</sup> 注意到该对话在为编拟第 4/CP.22 号决定第 2(f)段所述技术文件提供信息方面发挥的作用；

2. 赞赏地注意到流离失所问题工作组各成员组织<sup>6</sup> 为响应第 1/CP.21 号决定第 49 段的要求所开展的工作；

3. 邀请各缔约方、《公约》和《巴黎协定》之下的各机构、联合国机构和相关的利害关系方在开展工作时酌情考虑附件所载建议；

4. 欢迎执行委员会决定<sup>7</sup> 延长流离失所问题工作组的任期，所依据的职权范围将在执行委员会下一次会议上详细拟订；

<sup>1</sup> 政府间气候变化专门委员会。2018 年。《全球升温 1.5°C：气专委关于全球升温超过工业化前水平 1.5°C 的影响及相关全球温室气体排放路径，同时联系加强对气候变化威胁的全球应对、可持续发展和消除贫困的努力问题的特别报告》。见 <http://ipcc.ch/report/sr15/>。

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/SB/2018/1。

<sup>3</sup> 载于 FCCC/SB/2017/1/Add.1 号文件。

<sup>4</sup> 见 <http://unfccc.int/node/285>。

<sup>5</sup> 见 <https://unfccc.int/node/182364>。

<sup>6</sup> 流离失所问题工作组各成员组织名单载于附件。



5. 鼓励执行委员会：

(a) 设法继续提高其在开展五年期滚动工作计划所载活动、特别是工作流程(e)<sup>8</sup> 之下的活动方面的响应度、有效性和绩效；

(b) 继续开展五年期滚动工作计划工作流程(d)<sup>9</sup> 之下关于人口流动问题的  
工作，包括考虑上文第 1(a)段所述执行委员会报告第 38 和第 39 段列出的活动；

(c) 利用《公约》和《巴黎协定》之下的机构的工作、信息和专门知识，  
并利用《2030 年可持续发展议程》和 2015-2030 年《仙台减少灾害风险框架》等  
国际进程，包括在通过在五年期滚动工作计划工作流程(c)<sup>10</sup> 之下设立的综合风  
险管理技术专家组开展工作之时；

(d) 继续与气候变化专门委员会和其他科学组织审议对科学信息的需求和  
知识差距；

(e) 在执行五年期滚动工作计划时更多地考虑易受气候变化不利影响的群体；

6. 还鼓励缔约方并邀请有关组织提供执行委员会五年期滚动工作计划的  
成功、及时执行所需的充足资源，其中酌情包括相关专家组、小组委员会、专题  
讨论小组、专题咨询组及重点议题特设工作组；

7. 表示感谢附属机构第四十八届会议第一期会议期间在执行委员会和附  
属履行机构主席指导下举行的苏瓦专家对话的组织者和参加者；

8. 邀请有关组织和其他利害关系方与执行委员会合作，包括通过伙伴关  
系开展合作，以便开发和传播产品，支持国家联络点、损失和损害联络点及其他  
相关实体提高人们对避免、尽量减少和处理损失和损害的认识；

9. 注意到执行委员会在确定第 4/CP.22 号决定第 2(f)段所述技术文件的范  
围方面向秘书处提供的协助；

10. 邀请各缔约方：

(a) 酌情考虑制订政策、计划和战略，并在开展避免、尽量减少和处理损  
失和损害的工作时酌情促进协调行动和监测进展情况；

(b) 在制订和执行旨在避免、尽量减少和处理损失和损害以及减少灾害风  
险的相关国家计划和战略时，酌情考虑到未来的气候风险；

11. 注意到本决定所述的有待秘书处开展的活动所涉估计预算问题；

12. 请秘书处在具备资金的情况下采取本决定所要求的行动。

<sup>7</sup> 见 FCCC/SB/2018/1 号文件，第 36 段。

<sup>8</sup> 战略工作流程(e)：就处理与气候变化不利影响相关的损失和损害的行动和支持，包括资金、  
技术和能力建设方面的行动和支持，加强合作和促进工作。

<sup>9</sup> 战略工作流程(d)：就人口流动，包括移徙、流离失所和有计划的搬迁，加强合作和促进  
工作。

<sup>10</sup> 战略工作流程(c)：就全面风险管理办法加强合作和促进工作。

## 附件

### 气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制执行委员会关于避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响有关流离失所问题的综合办法的报告中所载的建议

1. 气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制执行委员会的下列建议是以执行委员会为响应第 1/CP.21 号决定第 49 段的要求而设立的流离失所问题工作组开展的工作为基础提出的：

(a) 感谢国际移民组织和灾害所致流离失所问题平台举办的流离失所问题工作组利害关系方协商研讨会的与会者提交的意见和文稿，也感谢其他各方提交的材料；

(b) 注意到流离失所问题工作组利害关系方协商研讨会的报告；

(c) 加强《公约》和《巴黎协定》之下的相关机构之间以及各体制安排、方案和平台之间的协调、一致性和协作，以便在开展工作中以及在与执行委员会协作方面，加深对气候变化背景下国内和跨境人口流动(包括移徙、流离失所和有计划的搬迁)的了解；

(d) 酌情邀请《公约》和《巴黎协定》之下的机构根据其任务和工作计划，便利各国以让受到与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所影响和面临此种流离失所风险的社区参与的方式，努力开展与气候变化相关的风险评估，并为国内和跨境人口流动的数据收集和分析工作拟订更好的标准；

(e) 邀请适应委员会和最不发达国家专家组根据其任务和工作计划并在与执行委员会协作的情况下，协助发展中国家缔约方将避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所问题的方法纳入相关国家规划进程，包括酌情纳入国家适应计划的制订和执行进程；

(f) 邀请缔约方酌情便利发展中国家缔约方努力落实下文第 2(g)段；

(g) 邀请缔约方：

(一) 考虑酌情制订法律、政策和战略，以反映为避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所和在广义的人口流动背景下采取综合办法的重要性，同时考虑到其各自的人权义务，并酌情考虑到其他相关国际标准和法律事项；

(二) 加强研究、数据收集、风险分析和信息共享工作，以便以让受到与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所影响和面临此种流离失所风险的社区参与的方式，更好地梳理、了解和管理与气候变化不利影响相关的人口流动；

(三) 加强戒备，包括早期预警系统、应急规划、撤离规划和抵御力建设战略和规划，并开发创新办法，如基于预测的供资办法<sup>1</sup>等，以避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所问题；

(四) 利用现有工具、指南和良好做法，酌情将与气候变化相关的人口流动挑战和机遇纳入国家规划进程，并酌情考虑通报作出的努力；

(五) 回顾关于境内流离失所问题的指导原则，并在设法采用综合方法避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所问题时，酌情力图加强旨在为境内流离失所者找到持久解决办法的努力；

(六) 在气候变化背景下，通过考虑移民和流离失所者以及原籍社区、过境和目的地社区的需要，并通过增加正规移民途径的机会，包括酌情通过符合国际劳工标准的劳工流动，酌情并按照本国法律和政策便利人员的有序、安全、正规和负责任的移徙和流动<sup>2</sup>；

(h) 邀请联合国机构、相关组织和其他利害关系方酌情并根据其各自的任务：

(一) 继续为缔约方和其他行为方的努力提供支持，包括提供资金、技术和能力建设，包括与社区和地方行为方一道以及为其作出努力，以便在各个层面，包括社区、国家、区域和国际层面，避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所问题；

(二) 支持和加强避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所问题方面的区域、次区域和跨境合作，包括在风险和脆弱性评估、梳理、数据分析、戒备和早期预警系统等方面；

(三) 继续开发和分享避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所问题方面的良好做法、工具和指南，尤其是在以下方面：

- a. 了解风险；
- b. 获得支助，包括资金、技术和能力建设；
- c. 酌情根据现行国内法及国际议定书和公约，向受影响个人和社区提供协助和保护；
- d. 酌情适用国际法律文书和规范框架；

(i) 邀请相关联合国机构及其他利害关系方向执行委员会提供资料，介绍它们在上述第 1(h)段所述工作方面开展的活动，以期执行委员会及其各专家组、缔约方和其他利害关系方的工作和今后的行动提供参考；

<sup>1</sup> 基于预测的供资办法将气候和气象数据与早期预警系统和尽早行动联系在一起。此种办法可在避免、尽量减少和处理气候变化影响，包括气候变化背景下的流离失所问题方面发挥支持作用。

<sup>2</sup> 见联合国大会文件 [A/RES/70/1](#)。

(j) 邀请相关联合国机构和其他利害关系方在便利各国努力处理与气候变化所致人口流动相关的机遇和挑战，包括处理全球移民契约以及国际移民问题审查论坛、联合国移民问题网络以及其他相关国际框架和行动方案的工作时，与《公约》之下的机构、特别是执行委员会接触，以避免气候变化方面的重复工作；

(k) 邀请秘书长考虑采取步骤，包括进行一次全系统战略审查，提高联合国系统的一致性，以便处理气候变化背景下的人口流动，并酌情便利将避免、尽量减少和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的流离失所问题的综合办法纳入拟设立的境内流离失所者问题高级别专题小组的工作。

2. 流离失所问题工作组的技术成员分别来自国际劳工组织、红十字会与红新月会国际联合会、国际移民组织、灾害所致流离失所问题平台、联合国开发计划署、联合国难民事务高级专员公署，以及气候变化与人口流动咨询小组(包括境内流离失所监测中心、挪威难民理事会、雨果观察社、阿拉伯环境与发展网络和难民国际)所代表的民间社会团体。

第 9 次全体会议

2018 年 12 月 15 日

## 第 11/CP.24 号决定

### 审查非《公约》附件一所列缔约方国家信息通报问题专家咨询小组的职权范围

缔约方会议，

忆及《公约》的有关条款，尤其是第四条第 1、3 和 7 款，以及第十二条第 1、4、5 和 7 款，

还忆及第 8/CP.5、3/CP.8、17/CP.8、8/CP.11、5/CP.15、1/CP.16、2/CP.17、14/CP.17、17/CP.18、18/CP.18、13/CP.19、19/CP.19、20/CP.19 和 20/CP.22 号决定，

承认非《公约》附件一所列缔约方国家信息通报问题专家咨询小组为在《公约》之下加强发展中国家在衡量、报告和核实安排方面的能力建设和参与做出的贡献，

认识到专家咨询小组在为编制和提交国家信息通报及两年期更新报告提供技术咨询和支持方面发挥了重要作用，

还认识到国家信息通报的编制是一个持续不断的进程，

1. 决定将非《公约》附件一所列缔约方国家信息通报问题专家咨询小组的任期延长八年，从 2019 年 1 月 1 日起，至 2026 年 12 月 31 日止，并将其更名为专家咨询小组；

2. 还决定专家咨询小组在履行任务时应按照第 19/CP.19 号决定及其附件运作；

3. 邀请没有第 3/CP.8 号决定附件第 3-8 段所述类组代表担任专家咨询小组成员的非《公约》附件一所列缔约方派出一名代表，继续以观察员身份参加小组的工作；

4. 注意到第 18/CMA.1 号决定第 15 段，其中作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议决定，专家咨询小组应自 2019 年 1 月 1 日起为《巴黎协定》服务，以协助落实《巴黎协定》第十三条规定的强化透明度框架；

5. 请附属履行机构第五十届会议(2019 年 6 月)审查和修订专家咨询小组的职权范围，同时考虑到第 19/CP.19 号决定附件、专家咨询小组的年度报告以及第 18/CMA.1 号决定第 15 段所述职能，以期作为建议提出一项决定草案，供缔约方会议第二十五届会议(2019 年 12 月)审议和通过；

6. 还请秘书处具备资金的情况下采取本决定所要求的行动。

第 9 次全体会议

2018 年 12 月 15 日